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POSTCOLONIAL TRANSITIONS ON THE SOUTHERN BORDERS OF THE 
FORMER SOVIET UNION 
The Return of Eurasianism? 
Bill Bowring* 
As the Soviet Union dissolved into a new territorial reality, it 
released the doubly repressed histories of Tsarist and Soviet 
imperium. In the states to the south of the new Russian 
Federation, the post-soviet jostled with the postcolonial as 
nations were reinvented across a vast swathe from the Caucuses 
through Central Asia. In the process, the old Russian linguistic 
duality between Russki (the ethnic Russian) and Rossiiskii (the 
citizen of Russia) founds its echo in Russia itself — which 
encompasses over 20 million Muslims — and in the newly 
sovereign states — all with large Russian minorities and even 
larger Russian-speaking populations. For the Azeris, Uzbeks and 
Kazaks, the repositioning of nation against a recent past of 
Russian dominance was significantly more problematic. In 
Chechnya, formally in the Russian Federation, it has reached a 
cathartic war. The argument here uses international human rights 
instruments as a litmus test of this troubled recent history. The 
controversial concept of Eurasia — now resurgent in Russian 
politics — may not necessarily mean the reinscription of Russian 
domination, but seeks to offer an alternative to the Atlantic 
Empire. 
Introduction: The Illusory Aftermath of September 11, 2001 
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the last vestiges of Russia’s — 
and the former Soviet Union’s — colonial ambitions in Central Asia seemed 
finally to have been abandoned. President Putin’s response to the tragic events 
in New York was swift. On 11 September itself he pledged full support to the 
people of the United States.1 On 22–23 September, American C-130 aircraft 
arrived in Tashkent, the capital of former Soviet Uzbekistan, without any 
protest from Putin.2 They were on their way to the former Soviet air base at 
Khanabad near the Afghan border. By October 2001 the United States and 
Uzbekistan reached an agreement granting the United States the use of a 
number of Uzbek airfields in return for promises to protect Uzbek security.3 In 
mid-December 2001, the United States and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement to 
                                                          
* Professor of Human Rights and International Law, London Metropolitan 
University. 
1 Statement of the President of the Russian Federation, at 
http://president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2001/09/28629.shtml 
2 La Guardia and Avis (2001). 
3 Duskin (2002). 
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build a 37 acre base at Manas near Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, for 
some 3000 troops and a large number of aircraft. Again, Russia did not protest. 
To many observers, this seemed to be a complete and final capitulation by 
Russia in the face of US power.4 
Yet the impression that Russia had finally abandoned its role in Central 
Asia has proved to be an illusion. In early December 2002, Russian military 
planes began landing at Kant airfield, 20 kilometres from Bishkek. The base is 
being established in accordance with the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in 
which Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Kazakstan, Tajikstan and Armenia 
participate,5 in order to provide air cover for their Collective Rapid 
Deployment Force.6 It is permanent, will be expanded — and is only 
25 kilometres from Manas.7 In mid-September 2003, in a decisive further step, 
the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov and his Kyrgyz counterpart met in 
the Kremlin to sign a formal legal agreement on the creation of a Russian air 
force base at Kant, and an agreement on the status of Russian service 
personnel in Kyrgyzstan. The base would be officially opened in late October 
2003. The news Agency RIA Novosti commented: ‘One way or another, the 
Russian air force base at Kant clearly shows that Moscow has come back to 
Central Asia to stay. And its friends and partners will have to take this fact into 
account.’8 Russia has shown no sign of disengaging from the Caucasus region 
either. 
President Putin has said that Russia’s role ‘is predetermined by the 
geopolitical position of Russia as one of the largest Eurasian powers … [with] 
a responsibility for maintaining security in the world on both the global and 
regional level’.9 There is a special significance in the use of the word 
‘Eurasian’ to which I will return. 
Did 9/11 therefore mark the definitive end of Russian/Soviet colonialism 
in the southern borderlands of the former Soviet Union? What are the legal and 
constitutional foundations for and consequences of these developments? An 
answer to these questions poses issues of considerable complexity, to which 
Russia has responded with what looks to some observers like schizophrenia.10 
The starting point, however, poses no difficulty: the identification of the 
territories under consideration. These are, first, the five states described 
together — erroneously, since they display great differences one from another 
— as Central Asia, or worse, the ‘stans’: Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Second, the three Caucasus states: Armenia, 
                                                          
4 On Russia’s response to the ‘War on Terrorism’, see Kipp (2002). 
5 The Collective Security Treaty was enacted on 20 April 1994 and registered at the 
UN Secretariat on 1 November 1995. 
6 The Rapid Deployment Force was created by the Heads of States of the CST at 
their summit in Yerevan, Armenia, on 25 May 2001 — see 
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav053001.shtml 
7 Eshanova (2002). 
8 ‘Why Russia Needs the Kant Base’ (2003). 
9 ‘Putin’s Foreign Policy Concept’ (2000). 
10 See especially Piontkovsky (2003). 
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Azerbaijan and Georgia. Third, I include Chechnya, which ‘enjoyed’ a brief 
period of independence from 1997 to 1999, and which is still embroiled in 
conflict. 
Complexity starts with the first steps in definition. First, what is the 
present constitutional space of Russia? The Russian Federation is composed at 
the time of writing of 89 subjects, including 21 ethnic republics and other 
ethnic entities, in which the ‘titular’ people are in control — Tatars, Bashkirs, 
Chuvash, Mari, and so on. Even though Russians remain the largest ethnic 
group, with at least 82 per cent of the population, the Russian Federation 
contains at least 120 ‘nations’. Does this mean that Russia remains a colonial 
state? 
Second, what was the juridical nature of the Russian Empire, and then of 
the Soviet Union? This article explores a number of respects in which both the 
Empire and the Soviet Union were significantly different from the Western 
European empires. The human geographer Alastair Bonnett perspicuously 
argues that: 
For, whereas modernity in the ‘capitalist West’ tended to be 
simultaneously depoliticising and racialising (typically, if not 
exclusively, around the idea that white European heritage people were 
the natural bearers of modernity),11 in the USSR it was simultaneously 
politicising and ethnicising (typically, although again not exclusively, 
around the idea that ‘Russian’ urban workers were the natural bearers of 
communism).12 
Does this mean that in some way Russian/Soviet colonialism was qualitatively 
different from Western European colonialism? 
Third, what then are the manifestations of the postcolonial, both in Russia 
and in the borderlands, and in their juridical interrelations? This is, I will 
argue, a thoroughly dynamic — indeed, dialectical — process. The variables 
include Russia’s image of itself — the constant discussions in the Russian 
academy and media as to the ‘Russian idea’ — and the conceptions the newly 
independent states (NIS) have of themselves and their own destinies. 
Fourth, a vitally important role in all of this is played by the relationship 
of Russia and of all the territories named above with international legal 
institutions and mechanisms, impacting both on self-definition and to relations 
between themselves. 
Khatuna Giorgadze cites Aron13 as distinguishing ‘postcolonial’ and 
‘post-imperial tendencies’ in the policies of former empires. Postcolonial 
means that Moscow would be expected to attempt to implement its strategic, 
economic and military interests in the former colonies, but will recognise their 
right to free action, not consider it worthwhile to restore the empire. Post-
imperial, on the other hand, considers the sovereignty of NIS illegitimate. In 
                                                          
11 See Bonnett (2000). 
12 Bonnett (2002), p 437. 
13 Aron (1998), p 37. 
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Giorgadze’s view, Russia has both: ‘Russia clearly values stability around its 
borders — provided it is itself the main guarantor of peace and stability in the 
region’; and further: ‘Although it denied traditionalism, the Soviet civilisation 
was based on some genuine peculiarities of Russian culture.’14 
Some Questions of Method: The Dialectic and Internal Complexity 
of Russian and non-Russian Identities 
It should be noted that the phrase ‘Rossiskaya Federatsiya’ (Russian 
Federation) cannot be accurately translated into English. The Russian language 
has two words which are translated into English as ‘Russian’. The first is 
‘russkii’, which means ‘ethnic Russian’, while the second is ‘rossiiskii’, which 
means ‘civic Russian’. The Federation is the ‘Rossiiskaya’ Federation, not the 
‘Russkaya’ Federation — it is the country not of civic, not of ethnic Russians 
— that is, it is the Federation of bearers of citizenship under the Constitution. 
Professor Valeriy Tishkov15 has proposed, as a ‘linguistic neologism of major 
significance, a more correct spelling of the title of the state Russia as Rossia.’16 
As he points out, ‘in reality, two distinct words exist in the Russian language: 
one is Rossia as the name of a state, the other is russkii (Russian) as the name 
of the people, their language and culture’. This is particularly significant for 
the many ethnicities who inhabit Russia, and who are often described, 
incorrectly, as Russians. As Tishkov notes, ‘however, they do not identify 
themselves as such, but rather as Rossians (in Russian rossiyane)’. When the 
president makes his New Year’s speech, he addresses not Russkii but 
Rossiyane. 
This is of the greatest importance, since the Federation embodies a 
striking paradox. As Khazanov points out,17 the Federation is ethnically more 
homogenous than, say, Britain or France. The most numerous national 
minorities are the Tatars (3.8 per cent), Ukrainians (2.3 per cent), Chuvash (1.2 
per cent), Bashkir (0.9 per cent), Belorussians (0.7 per cent) and Mordovians 
(0.6 per cent). There are almost 200 ethnic groups in Russia today, but most 
exist in relatively and absolutely tiny numbers.18 Duncan puts this in a slightly 
different perspective: ‘The Russian Federation … maintained a geographical 
(rossiiskaia) rather than ethnic (russkaia) Russian identity; it was not the 
homeland of the Russian people, but rather the residual of Soviet territory after 
the non-Russian union republics were subtracted.’19 
If the Russian Federation itself is a melting pot, how does it perceive its 
immediate surroundings? Here there is another dialectic at work. On the one 
hand, President Putin has a clear orientation towards Europe which has direct 
legal consequences. He has supported Russia’s membership, since 1996, of the 
                                                          
14 Giorgadze (2002), pp 66–67. 
15 Director of the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnology of the Russian Academy 
of Science, and former Minister of Nationalities of the Russian Federation. 
16 Tishkov (1997), pp x, 246–71. 
17 Khazanov (1997), p 135. 
18 See Pain (1999). 
19 Duncan (2002), p 4. 
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Council of Europe, and fostering improved relations with the EU — after all, 
40 per cent or more of Russia’s trade is with the new Europe — and NATO. At 
the same time, Putin is temperamentally cautious. The foreign policy analyst 
Bobo Lo says: ‘As a career intelligence officer, Putin combines conservative 
and statist political instincts with a superior understanding of the deficiencies 
and corruptions of the Soviet/post-Soviet system.’20 It has also been argued by 
the Russian legal sociologist Andrei Medushevskii that Putin tends to balance 
between reformist and conservative forces as his preferred mode of 
governance: his is a classical Bonapartist regime.21 
More importantly for this paper, he has increasingly tended towards what 
Duncan has described, in the post-soviet context, as ‘Eurasianism’. Duncan 
uses the term: 
to refer to policies which give priority towards promoting the co-
operation and unity of the post-Soviet states. In general, eurasianists 
tend towards co-operation with China and certain Middle Eastern states 
such as Iran, rather than with the West, and to give low priority to 
human rights questions in international affairs.22 
I return to the subject of ‘Eurasianism’ at the end of this paper. 
The Pre-colonial Pasts of the Borderlands 
In each of the borderland territories under consideration, the primordial or 
other origins of their titular peoples is a matter of intense debate. In each case, 
there is controversy as to whether a nation in any sense existed prior to the 
nationalities policies of the Soviet Union. But there are significant differences 
between the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
M Crawford Young has aptly summarised the history of the Caucasus as 
follows: 
To the south … especially in the Caucasus, Russian expansion in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had a very different dynamic. Here 
the point of alternative reference was the Islamic world, in particular the 
Ottoman and Persian states. The embattled Christian ethnopolities of 
Georgia and Armenia, each with its own national church, were 
mobilised cultural communities, with an historical consciousness forged 
in centuries of struggle for survival against militarily powerful Islamic 
states, to whom they were often forced to render obeisance. Russian 
expansion therefore offered a preferable form of subordination, 
cemented by the integration opportunities the Tsarist state provided for 
the aristocratic strata.23 
                                                          
20 Lo (2002), p 175. 
21 See Medushevskii (2001). 
22 Duncan (2002), p 6. 
23 Crawford Young (1995), pp 82–83. 
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One consequence of these processes is that traditional, customary law was 
long ago overlaid first by Christian and Muslim law, then by Russian law 
(especially the Westernising reforms of Tsar Aleksandr II in 1864, introducing 
an independent judiciary, trial by jury, and other innovations), and then by 
Soviet law. 
The North Caucasus: The Intransigence of the Chechens 
The Chechens have been the subject of the fiercest military repression, and 
there is no doubt as to their nationhood.24 They are the largest ethnic group in 
the North Caucasus (more than a million people), and have a history dating 
back to at least the fourth century AD of resisting a series of invaders, 
including the Tatar-Mongols, and consolidating themselves into a self-
conscious mountain people, in some respects resembling the Kurds.25 They 
were the most intransigent opponents of Russian expansion in the eighteenth 
century. The Chechens fought bitterly during their unsuccessful 1850s 
rebellion against the Russian Empire, led by their hero, Imam Shamyl. 
The territory was contested during the Civil War: the Bolsheviks seized 
the region in 1918 but were dislodged in 1919 by White forces under General 
AI Denikin. After Soviet rule was re-established, the area was included in 
1921 in the so-called Mountain People’s Republic. The Chechen Autonomous 
Region was created in 1922, and in 1934 it became part of the Chechen–
Ingush Region, made a republic in 1936. After Chechen and Ingush units 
collaborated with the invading Germans during World War II, most Chechens 
were deported in 1944 to Central Asia, mainly to Kazakstan. As with the 
Crimean Tatars, deported at the same time to Uzbekistan, some 40 per cent of 
the population died — a real genocide, and the source of continuing bitterness. 
The deportees were only repatriated in 1956, and the Chechen Republic was 
re-established as part of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics 
(RSFSR) within the Soviet Union in 1957.26 The First Chechen War of 1994–
97, and the Second Chechen War of 1999 to the present day have been the 
occasion for the utmost brutality and violation of human rights by the Russian 
armed forces and law enforcement agencies, and by the Chechen resistance 
forces. 
The Trans-Caucasus Mosaic 
The territories south of the Caucasus mountains have none of the disastrous 
certainties of Chechnya. Viktor Shnirelman has noted, in the context of the 
competing claims of Georgians, Abkhazians and South Ossetians, that: 
In the multiethnic mosaic of Transcaucasia it is practically impossible 
to construct an ethnocentric version of ethnogenesis without 
encroaching upon the cultural legacy of neighbouring peoples and, by 
                                                          
24 See Lieven (1998). 
25 See www.chechnyafree.ru/index.php?lng=eng&section=historyeng&row=1 
26 www.encyclopedia.com/html/section/Chechnya_History.asp 
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asserting a prior claim to the ‘homeland’, placing them in the unequal, 
inferior position of a ‘younger brother’.27  
Russian influence in the region began between 1700 and 1720, as Peter I 
(the Great) brought the Caspian coast under his control. With the final breakup 
of the Safavid dynasty in the middle of the eighteenth century, the remains of 
their empire in the Caucasus fell to a number of independent khanates, among 
them the khanates of Baku, Garabagh, Guba and Nakhchivan. These khanates 
were mainly Islamic and Turkic, and frequently at war with each other for 
control of the area. The Russian Empress Catherine II (the Great), sought to 
extend the Russian Empire’s hegemony against Iran, which was consolidating 
its hold on the territories of southern Azerbaijan formerly ruled by the 
Safavids. As a result, two Russo-Iranian wars were fought, from 1804–13 and 
from 1826–28. The first war ended with the Treaty of Gulistan, which ceded 
the majority of the northern khanates to Russian authority. The Treaty of 
Turkmanchay, ending the second war, gave Russia further control over the 
khanates of Yerevan and Nakhchivan. The effect of these two treaties was to 
divide Azerbaijan in two, with northern Azerbaijan subjugated to Russian 
colonial rule.28 This established Azerbaijan within its present territory. 
Azerbaijan can thus be said, more than Georgia or Armenia, to have been 
the creation of Russian expansion or colonialism. It has the largest population 
of the three states in the region, nearly 8 million, and is 90 per cent ethnic 
Azeri, with small Dagestani and Russian minorities.29 The Azeri language is a 
mix of Turkic and Persian, the history of the territory is highly complex,30 and 
more Azeri speakers live in Iran than in Azerbaijan itself. 
Georgia and Armenia, in contrast, were drawn to Russia by their fiercely 
Christian cultures. Georgia is highly fragmented: Vivien Law31 points out that 
over a dozen languages are spoken in Georgia, and although Georgian itself is 
the first language of over half the population, it is estimated that about one 
million are speakers of the closely related Mingrelian language.32 She notes 
that, ‘apart from a brief Golden Age in the twelfth century [the Georgians’] 
ethnohistory does not provide a satisfactory self-image, whether one focuses 
on the past — subjugation by Arabs, Mongols, Turks, Persians, Russians — or 
on the present — civil and inter-ethnic conflict’.33 
Armenia has a smaller population, just over three million, and is one of 
the very few ethnically — almost — homogenous states in the world, where 
Armenian is spoken by 96 per cent of the population.34 
                                                          
27 Shnirelman (1998), p 63. 
28 www.baku.com/#1 
29 www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/aj.html#People 
30 See www-scf.usc.edu/~baguirov/azeri/azerbaijan4.htm 
31 Law (1998), p 169. 
32 See the Georgian official figures at the Parliament website 
www.parliament.ge/GENERAL/popl/pp2.htm 
33 Law (1998), p 193. 
34 www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/am.html#People 
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The Specificities of Central Asia 
M Crawford Young characterises Central Asia as follows: 
Central Asia was a purely colonial model of expansionism. The pastoral 
Turkic population on the southern fringe of the Russian string of 
Siberian outposts were readily perceived as a security threat. The 
imperative of security produced from the eighteenth century onward a 
slow southward push to expand the limes … the final Russian surge, 
from the 1860s to the 1880s, coincided with the global paroxysm of 
imperial annexations, as all parts of Africa and Asia not yet under 
European yoke were viewed … as a vast melon ripe for carving.35 
Each of the five Central Asian states is a ‘nationalising state’ in the sense 
explored by Roger Brubaker,36 in which the ‘titular’ people or ‘nation’ is 
increasingly given priority. But there are great differences, starting with their 
relative populations. In each case, the titular nation has a majority — 
sometimes, as in the case of Kazakstan or Kyrgyzstan, a narrow majority. But 
these are substantial minorities which demonstrate the arbitrariness of Soviet 
territorial autonomy. 
The Demographic Dynamics of Central Asia 
Kazakstan has the largest Russian population, shares a long border with 
Russia, has reason to be nervous of China, and is closest to Russia in policy 
terms. It is five times the size of France, but with a population of nearly 
17 million, similar to The Netherlands. Many Russians have left since 
independence, though they remain 30 per cent of the population. There are 
small Uzbek and Uyghur minorities — most of the latter people live in the 
neighbouring Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. Russian remains 
the language spoken by most of the population. This means that in Almaty, and 
even in Astana, the new capital, the Kazak language is rarely heard. Despite 
their small numerical size, the Uzbek and Uyghur minorities live compactly in 
the south of the country, and pose a greater security threat than the Russians 
living mainly in the north. 
Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, has a population of only about five million. Like 
Kazakstan, it is multi-ethnic, but with a much larger Uzbek minority, 10 per 
cent of the population. Russians comprise 18 per cent. Tajikistan has a slightly 
larger population (about seven million), but an Uzbek minority comprising a 
quarter of the population. There are few Russians, although a considerable 
force of Russian troops is stationed at the border with Afghanistan. 
Turkmenistan is similar in size to Kyrgyzstan, and is 77 per cent Turkmen, 
with an Uzbek minority of nearly 10 per cent. 
Uzbekistan has by far the largest population in the region, 25.5 million, 
comprising 80 per cent Uzbeks, with only 5 per cent Russians. Thus it is not 
only nearly twice the size, in terms of population, of its nearest rival, 
                                                          
35 Crawford Young (1995), p 83. 
36 Brubaker (1996). 
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Kazakstan, it has very substantial minorities in each of the other four Central 
Asian states — minorities who live compactly in contested areas, especially 
the Ferghana Valley, the most fertile region of Central Asia. There are in fact 
over three million Uzbeks living in the other four Central Asian states. 
Furthermore, 8 per cent of Afghanistan’s population are Uzbeks, providing the 
basis for General Rashid Dostum’s power. Although he is a deputy defence 
minister in the postwar government, he has his own private Uzbek army which 
still controls a large swathe of northern Afghanistan.37 
The Political Undead: Communist Survivors 
The Central Asian states also have in common the fact that four of their 
presidents presiding over their nationalising processes are former senior 
officials of the Soviet period: Nazerbaev in Kazakstan (First Secretary of the 
Kazak Communist Party from 1989),38 Akaev in Kyrgyzstan (President of the 
Academy of Sciences since 1988),39 Niyazov in Turkmenistan (First Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party from 1985)40 and 
Karimov in Uzbekistan (from 1989 First Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Uzbek Republic).41 Rahmonov rose rapidly from director of a state farm to 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in 1992, and then President of Tajikistan.42 
Indeed, of the eight states of the southern borderlands, five (Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) are ruled by former 
Communist First Secretaries.43 
Myths and Symbols of Central Asia 
It should come as no surprise that there have been strenuous attempts to create 
surprising paradoxes — new historical identities. President Karimov of 
Uzbekistan has been particularly assiduous in constructing a new official 
Uzbek history. He has chosen the medieval ruler Temur (Tamerlaine, in fact a 
Chinggisid Mongol — not an Uzbek at all) as Uzbekistan’s primary political 
icon. As Annette Bohr points out: ‘The deliberate linking of the Temurid 
period with present-day Uzbekistan seeks to prove false all assertions that the 
Uzbek nation is an artificial construct of the Leninist-Stalinist period.’44 
President Rahmonov of Tajikistan on the other hand has sought to 
legitimate his regime by linking it to the Samanid era,45 culminating in the 
                                                          
37 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3079563.stm 
38 Details at www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0835048.html 
39 Details at www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri_004_011_002.htm 
40 See his official biography at 
www.turkmenistanembassy.org/turkmen/gov/presbio.html 
41 See his official biography at www.press-
service.uz/eng/president_eng/president_eng.htm 
42 Akiner (2001), p 52. 
43 Suny (2001), p 6. 
44 Bohr (1998), p 146. 
45 See Bashiri (1997). 
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grand celebrations in September 1999 of the 1100 year anniversary of the 
founding of the Samanid state,46 including the construction of a grandiose 
monument to Ismael Samani — bearing a striking resemblance to himself — 
in the centre of Dushanbe. Ironically, Ismael’s centre of power was not 
Dushanbe — or indeed Tajikistan at all — but Bukhara, located in the centre 
of Uzbekistan. 
The Kyrgyz have their own symbol, the image of Manas, the legendary 
warrior and hero of the Kyrgyz epic poem.47 Their territory, however, was 
historically the home of a wide variety of Turkic and other tribal groupings, 
while the Kyrgyz probably originated on the banks of the Upper Yenisey River 
in Siberia, migrating in the tenth century AD.48 The story of Manas was 
elevated into a national epic by Soviet scholars, who produced a written text 
for the first time, and by Kyrgyz nationalists of the Soviet period. It was only 
under the Soviet Union that a specifically Kyrgyz consciousness arose. 
The Turkmen, too, claim ancient descent, from the Oguz tribes who 
migrated into the territory in the seventh and eighth centuries, were serially 
oppressed by a series of empires, and eventually made an accommodation with 
the Russian Empire by 1885.49 
Perhaps the most controversial set of origin myths is to be found in 
Kazakstan. Sally Cummings points out that ‘the contemporary borders of the 
Kazakhstani state have existed only since 1924. Prior to that Soviet 
demarcation, the borders of the Kazakh steppe were fluid, subject to 
encroachments by the Russian and Chinese empires.’50 The development of 
Kazak national consciousness came late, coinciding with the expansion of the 
Russian Empire into the territory. Almaty, the largest city of Kazakstan 
(1.5 million inhabitants), and former capital, was a nomad settlement until 
1854 when the Russian colonialists established a fortress first named 
Zailiyskoe, and then renamed Verniy (‘faithful’). Only in 1867 was the fortress 
given the status of a town, and only in the Soviet period was its Kazak name 
returned to it. 
Imperial Russia and Its Expansion from the Sixteenth Century 
From the preceding section, it might appear that the Russian Empire simply 
expanded into Muslim territories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
But Islam and Russia have been inseparably linked for much longer. The 
earliest expansion of Muscovy was made possible by Ivan the Terrible’s 
victories over the Moslem Khanates of Kazan in 1552,51 and Astrakhan in 
1554–56.52 
                                                          
46 Akiner (2001), pp 63–64. 
47 Bohr (1998), p 145. 
48 Anderson (1999), p 1. 
49 See the official account at 
www.turkmenistanembassy.org/turkmen/history/history.html 
50 Cummings (2000), p 1. 
51 See Sloan (nd). 
52 See www.zum.de/whkmla/military/16cen/astrakhan15541556.html 
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The impression is sometimes given, in discussions of the conflict in 
Chechnya, that Russia is a homogenously Slav, Orthodox Christian nation 
facing a Muslim opponent, engaged in a geo-political showdown. In reality, 
Russia is — and has been since its early statehood — a Muslim as well as an 
Orthodox Christian state, with 20 million Muslims in its population. Islam is 
one of the four ‘traditional’ religions of Russia — the others are Orthodox 
Christianity, Buddhism and Judaism. This is one of the formulations of the 
controversial Federal Law of 26 September 1997 ‘On Freedom of Conscience 
and on Religious Associations’.53 
As Khenkin notes,54 the fundamental task of Russia was not cultural or 
regional assimilation, but the security of the Russian state. Even before Ivan, 
the Finno-Ugric tribes who populated the Oka basin and the upper Volga 
(whose descendants are the ‘titular’ nations of the republics of Marii El and 
Mordoviya) served the first Moscow princes.55 On entering the Russian 
Empire, the Turkic Moslems of the Volga region and the North Caucasus, and 
the Buddhists of South Siberia and the Kalmyk steppe, retained their way of 
life, language and religion. Tsimbaev asserts that ‘the heart of Russia’s policy 
with respect to the peoples it annexed was not national but social 
assimilation’.56 That meant that the local ruling elites were not annihilated, 
driven out or assimilated, but were incorporated as a whole into Russia’s own 
elite, retaining their own language, religion, and rights and privileges. In 
return, they were to give devoted service to the Russian Tsar. 
It has been stated that the only religious practice persecuted was defection 
from Orthodoxy: 
Catholics and orthodox Moslems were an organic part of the ruling 
class as long as they belonged to their faith by birth and upbringing, but 
any Russian noble who became a schismatic would lose all estate 
privileges.57 
It followed that the ‘fundamental principle of the Russian Empire was social 
and class division rather than nationality or religious division’. Pershits and 
Smirnova note58 that, prior to October 1917, three legal systems coexisted in 
the North Caucasus — Adaty, Sharia (for Moslems in the region) and Russian 
laws. This distinctive policy was only substantially disrupted by Tsar Nicholas 
I, and meant the abandonment of any attempt to create a rossiiskii (civic 
Russian) state, and a decisive shift to a russkii (ethnic Russian) path. 
                                                          
53 Russian text at www.hro.org/docs/rlex/cons.htm 
54 Khenkin (1997), p 2. 
55 Tsimbaev (1998), p 59. 
56 Tsimbaev (1998), p 59. 
57 Tsimbaev (1998), p 61. 
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The Soviet Union and Its Paradoxes of Constitutionalism, 
Subordination, Ethnicised Discourse and Practice 
I have already suggested some intriguing differences between Western 
European and Russian colonialism (imperialism). The Soviet Union presented 
itself as the sworn enemy of imperialism, and the ‘right of nations to self-
determination’ was the centrepiece of Lenin’s and Stalin’s policy. Bonnett has 
correctly criticised ‘a desire to portray the USSR as a continuation of or, at 
some point, as reverting to Tsarist imperialism and, by extension, to offer the 
Soviet empire’s ‘survival’ in the mid- and late 20th century as a colonial 
anachronism threads its way through a great deal of western and post-Soviet 
commentary’.59 He adds that: ‘The USSR provides an example of the way that 
national, regional, religious, cultural and political identities have been 
systematically reified, yet have rarely been amenable to racial explanation.’60 
Thus the Soviet Union applied an ethnic, rather than civic, criterion, with 
surprising and paradoxical results. As Khazanov shows,61 the Union was a 
‘pseudofederation of ethnoterritorial republics’ in which most of the 
nationalities were allowed various degrees of autonomy. In this way, state-
controlled ethnic identity became decisive, through the connecting of 
nationality with specific territories, often arbitrarily mapped, linking the 
political and cultural-linguistic positions of nationalities with a degree of 
autonomy, through a hierarchy of union republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Georgia, etc), autonomous regions and autonomous districts. 
It is noteworthy that, even during the Soviet period, and despite the often-
repressive effect of central Party rule, the goal of leaders of the ‘titular’ 
nationality in each particular territory was to preserve as much as possible of 
its ethnic character and territorial integrity in order to gain advantageous 
positions as against other nationalities.62 The Chairmen of the Supreme Soviets 
of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, both of which aspired to the status of ‘union 
republics’, were always members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 
the Soviet Unjon, along with those of the Union Republics — the only two 
‘autonomous republics’ so represented.63 By the end of the 1970s, more than 
half of the professional cadre in half of the Union Republics and 11 of the 21 
autonomous republics in the RSFSR was composed of the titular ethnic 
group.64 As the Soviet Union weakened and finally collapsed, in December 
1991, it is hardly surprising that the same leaders sought to turn symbolic 
authority into real power, and had a strong base for doing so.  
Bonnett has noted:  
Unlike Siberia and ‘Russian East Asia’, which were considered to be 
assimilated parts of Russia, Soviet Central Asia was deemed to need to 
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60 Bonnett (2002), p 440, citing Shanin (1986). 
61 Khazanov (1997), p 126. 
62 Dowley (1998), p 363. 
63 Shaimiev (1996a), p 1. 
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be propelled along a track of ‘state-sponsored evolutionism’.65 Its 
destination was a de-ethnicised, denationalised, ‘internationalist’ 
communist identity. However, in order to get this far and in order to 
keep its ‘backward’ population engaged, it was considered a strategic 
necessity to have a period of ethnonational identification … These new 
‘national’ units were considered a necessary stage of political 
development, a stepping stone towards a modern westernised political 
consciousness.66 
In the southern borderlands which are the subject of this paper, each person 
had a dual, contradictory, juridical personhood, expressed in the internal 
passport which each was required to bear. This passport defined the bearer in 
law as a citizen of the Soviet Unjon, but the notorious ‘Point Five’ defined the 
bearer’s ‘nationality’ — Tatar, Jewish or whatever — inherited strictly from 
their parents. Fierman puts it this way: 
Along with other possible forms of self-identification, during the late 
Soviet era most inhabitants of the USSR were acutely conscious of their 
officially prescribed affiliation with at least two communities. One, 
formally cultivated throughout the educational system, was ‘the Soviet 
people’, which was embodied in USSR citizenship. The other category, 
based on ‘nationality’ or ‘ethnicity’ [natsionalnost], was historically 
rooted in such criteria as a common territory, language, history and 
economic community … for individual citizens ethnic identification 
was formalised through official documents they held throughout their 
adult lives. ‘Nationality’ was often considered in quotas for education 
and jobs.67 
The Role of International Affiliations and International Standards 
in State Legitimisation 
I have already highlighted the inward-looking dialectic of Russian Eurasianism 
and the complex origins of the southern borderlands. There is another aspect 
altogether to the changes which have taken place since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. This takes the form of greatly increased engagement 
with international organisations and mechanisms. The eight newly independent 
states which are the focus of this article all seek to define and legitimate their 
sovereignty in relation to the international community of states, and 
international good standing is an important factor in achieving recognition. 
This has a double-edged effect. On the one hand, ratification of international 
instruments is relatively cheap and easy. But the consequences can be 
threefold. The first — intended — result will no doubt be international 
recognition and approbation. The second — entirely predictable — will be the 
possibility of interference and censure by international bodies. The third — 
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unintended — will be powerful legitimation for internal critics of the regime in 
question. 
Before coming to the present day, however, it should be remembered that 
the region in fact has a longer involvement in international institutions and 
mechanisms than might at first appear to be the case.68 Tsar Nikolai II, advised 
by the great Dutch diplomat FF Martens, played a leading role in the early 
development of international humanitarian law — the laws of war.69 Martens 
organised and conducted the First World Peace Conference at The Hague in 
1899, and facilitated the Second World Peace Conference which met in The 
Hague on 15 June 1907 with 44 countries participating. 
The Soviet Union and the United Nations 
The Soviet Union was not only a founder member of the United Nations, but 
was a prompt ratifier of the various UN human rights treaties.70 One of the 
final acts of the Soviet Union before its dissolution on 8 December 199171 was 
to ratify, on 1 October 1991, the First Optional Protocol (CCPROP1) to the 
ICCPR, giving all people within its jurisdiction the right to complain to the 
Human Rights Committee.72 
The Human Rights Committee of the UN has ‘consistently taken the view 
that successor States automatically succeed to their predecessors’ obligations 
under the ICCPR and the Optional Protocols’.73 This view has also been 
supported by the UN Commission on Human Rights,74 the UN Secretary 
General75 and, most importantly, the practice of most successor states76 — for 
example, China, as successor to the United Kingdom, has continued to submit 
reports to the Human Rights Committee on behalf of Hong Kong, even though 
it has not itself ratified the ICCPR.77 However, the borderland states about 
                                                          
68 See also Bowring (1999b), and other works cited. 
69 Pustogarov (1996). 
70 The USSR ratified the Convention of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) on 6 March 1969, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) on 3 January 1976, the International Covenant on Civil 
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71 See Maksymiuk (2001). 
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has still to ratify the ICESCR, the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, or the 
CRC 
73 Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000), p 5, and see UN doc. A/48/40 (1993 Annual 
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the former USSR, and General Comment 25, para 4  
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which I am writing are exceptions — they have not considered themselves to 
be successors to the Soviet Union. 
The Caucasus and the United Nations 
I will take the Caucasus first. Armenia ratified or acceded to the ‘big six’ UN 
treaties in 1993, Azerbaijan from 1992 to 1996 and Georgia in 1994. In each 
case, they ratified the First Optional Protocol. Their prompt ratification and 
accession clearly had a great deal to do with their desire to join the Council of 
Europe, of which more is discussed below. 
Central Asia and the United Nations 
The Central Asian states display a much more varied, and indeed paradoxical, 
relation to international commitments. On the one hand, independent accession 
to UN treaty obligations plays an important symbolic role in demonstrating the 
break from the Soviet past; yet on the other hand each state appears, despite 
the new commitments, to be replicating contemporary Russian practice. This is 
characterised by a stubborn resistance to change, and persistence of Soviet 
methods and habits.78 
Furthermore, Uzbekistan illustrates all three results sketched above. It has 
sought recognition by ratifying all of the big six UN treaties, together with the 
First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. It has taken steps to amend its 
legislation in line with the requirements of the treaties. 
But it has attracted international censure. Its practice, especially in the 
criminal justice field, is a long way removed from the demands of the United 
Nations.79 The UN’s Special Rapporteur on Torture, Theo van Boven, has 
recently published a damning report80 following his visit to Uzbekistan in 
November and December 2002. He concluded that ‘torture or similar ill-
treatment is systematic as defined by the Committee against Torture’, and that 
‘the pervasive and persistent nature of torture throughout the investigative 
process cannot be denied’. And a number of complaints against it, brought by 
individuals with the help of newly active domestic non-governmental 
organisations, are now pending before the UN’s Human Rights Committee. 
All five Central Asian states ratified the CRC, the least controversial 
human rights treaty for them, by 1994. However, the record thereafter is 
patchy. Kyrgyzstan, for some time known as the most liberal of the ‘stans’,81 
ratified all of the big six and First Optional Protocol by 1997. Even 
Turkmenistan, known to the outside world mainly through the extraordinary 
personality cult associated with President Niyazov, the ‘Turkmenbashi’,82 
                                                          
78 For which see Bowring (2000, p 362, 1997, 1995). 
79 See Korff (2003). 
80 Report of 3 February 2003, Document E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2. The full text, in 
PDF and Word, may be found at www.unhchr.ch/, looking under ‘documents of 
Charter-based bodies’, ‘country’, ‘Uzbekistan’, and ‘2003’. 
81 This distinction has now, following a wave of repression, been lost. 
82 An extraordinary website full of Turkmenbashi phenomena can be found at 
www.yurope.com/people/danko/niyazov.html 
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finally completed the ‘big six’ by ratifying the Convention Against Torture in 
1999. Tajikistan, riven by civil war from 1992 until 1997, ratified the two 
Covenants, the ICCPR and CCPROP1, and the ICESCR in April 1999, and 
thus completed the ‘big six’ treaties. 
Kazakstan, in many ways the most liberal of the Central Asian states, has 
paradoxically been the most dilatory in ratifying the main UN treaties. Only in 
September 1998 did it manage to ratify the CERD, CEDAW and CAT. 
Kazakstan’s first State Report under the CAT was examined by the UN 
Committee Against Torture at a public hearing in Geneva in April and May 
2001. This was attended not only by the Minister of Justice of Kazakstan, but 
also leading NGO representatives, who prepared a hard-hitting parallel report, 
focusing on human rights violations in the penitentiary system and at the hands 
of the police. The hearing, and the Committee’s critical conclusions and 
recommendations, were followed by public discussion in Kazakstan.83 Yet, 
alone of the Central Asian states, it has at the time of writing still not ratified 
the two UN Covenants, the ICCPR and ICESCR.84 
Kazakstan’s large neighbour, the Russian Federation, has of course been a 
member of the Council of Europe since 1996, and Kazakstan has been seeking 
official observer status at the Council, with a view to its own future accession. 
After all, if the three Caucasus states, with all their problems, have joined, why 
should Kazakstan not follow them? But in March 2003 the Council of Europe 
made it clear that no further progress could be made until Kazakstan abolishes 
the death penalty, revises its constitution in line with the recommendations of 
the Council’s Venice Commission85 and guarantees freedom of media and 
press and free action for the democratic opposition.86 
The Caucasus States and the Council of Europe 
A comparison of Kazakstan’s continuing problems with the Council of Europe 
and the relative ease with which the Caucasus states have joined raises a 
question of double standards. 
Georgia ratified the Statute of the Council of Europe on 27 April 1999, 
followed by Armenia and Azerbaijan, both on 25 January 2001. Each of the 
three has ratified an impressive list of Council of Europe treaties.87 All three 
have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture (ECPT), which gives its 
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86 See Society for Central Asian Democracy Support, 14 March 2003 
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Committee unprecedented powers to visit all places of detention.88 Georgia has 
not yet ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, but Armenia and Azerbaijan have done so.89 Only Armenia has 
ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, on 
25 January 2002. 
However, all this ratification activity seems somewhat empty when it is 
considered that this is a region still in turmoil. Georgia has no effective control 
over two large parts of its territory, the ‘Republic of Abkhazia’90 and South 
Ossetia.91 Armenia and Azerbaijan are still locked in conflict over the disputed 
territory of Nogorno (‘mountainous’) Karabakh.92 Azerbaijan considers the 
RNK to be a zone of Armenian occupation. Neither Abzhazia nor the RNK 
(other than by Armenia) has been recognised by any state in the world. 
The Council of Europe is worried. The Report of the Committee on the 
Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council 
of Europe of 13 September 2002 on Armenia93 had cause to ‘regret that a 
number of fundamental commitments have not been honoured within the time 
limits previously agreed to, most particularly ratification of Protocol No 6 
(abolition of the death penalty) and adoption of a new Criminal Code’. The 
similar report for Azerbaijan, dated 18 September 2002,94 also regretted ‘the 
slowness in the expected progress to improve the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Azerbaijan’, and called on the authorities ‘to take 
speedily the necessary steps to promote the development of a truly pluralist 
and democratic society’. A similar Resolution on Georgia95 was alarmed that 
‘little progress has been made as regards respect for human rights’. 
It is hard to understand why the Council of Europe agreed that these three 
states should join, given the level of conflict and gross violation of human 
rights. Nevertheless, it may be seen that, far from achieving greater legitimacy 
through membership of the organisation, the three states have instead exposed 
themselves to a far greater level of interference and public scrutiny. It is also 
the case for each of them that their newly active non-governmental sector has 
received powerful legitimation. 
I have already suggested that the newly independent states of the southern 
borderlands have embraced membership of UN and Council of Europe human 
rights treaties partly so as to emphasise their break from the juridical culture of 
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the Soviet Union. What, then, is the ideological basis for Russia’s renewed 
activity in the region? How does it differ from the Soviet ideology outlined 
above? 
The Significance of ‘Eurasianism’ for Russia’s Return to Its 
Borderlands 
President Putin has many times shown his interest in the concept of ‘Eurasia’, 
a clear signal of interest in a set of ideas which has its roots in Slavophile 
traditions which take their place on the political right. Bonnett has described 
them in this way: 
To a degree unique among ‘other major European’ nations, the 
assumption that ‘European civilisation’ was inherently superior to all 
others, or even a meaningful category, was actively contested. Russia’s 
defeat by Britain, France and Turkey during the Crimean War (1853–5), 
combined with a persistent unease at the prospect of Russia ever really 
being accepted as fully European, encouraged those voices that 
condemned Westernisation as the spirit of alienation, materialism and 
superficiality. Throughout the mid and late 19th century, Slavophile and 
pan-Slavic critics poured scorn on the empty and instrumental world of 
the Occident.96 
This was the fertile ground upon which the notion of ‘Eurasianism’ emerged in 
the post-1917 context of the White emigration. 
The philologist and ethnographer Count Nikolai Trubetskoi (1890–1938) 
wrote his key work ‘Yevropa i chelovechestvo (Europe and humanity)’97 in 
1920 (it was published in Sofia), and inspired a group of authors to publish 
‘Iskhod k Vostoku (Exodus to the East)’ in 1921.98 He argued that no European 
state could be compared with Russia, since Russia is not a nation in the 
ordinary sense of the word, but a whole continent — Eurasia. ‘Turkic blood 
mingles in Russian veins with that of the Ugro-Finns and the Slavs,’ he wrote, 
and he referred to Russia’s ‘non-European, half-Asiatic face’. As Mark Bassin 
points out, he insisted that Russia’s ‘existence as an empire was a thing of the 
past; Russians now represented just another of the constituent “ethnographic” 
groups which collectively comprised Eurasia’s multi-cultural complexion.’99  
‘Eurasia’ is not only an anti-Western discourse; it also provides the space 
for an accommodation between Russian Orthodox and Muslim traditions. 
Agadjanian notes that ‘Still another cultural framework is Eurasia, a notion of 
the old continental cultural space of tradition opposed to the ‘Atlantic 
civilisation’ of modernity. Also, Eurasia is the place of Christianity’s 
encounter with Islam. While the usual stereotyped attitude towards Islam is 
unfavourable, in the public discourse Christianity and Islam are sometimes 
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drawn together. Russia is a unique combined Eurasian civilisation of Orthodox 
Slavs and Muslim Turks and, therefore, the ‘Western democratic standards 
cannot be fully transferred into Russian reality’. Thus Polosin, a former 
Orthodox priest converted to Islam, has defended the idea of a ‘social alliance’ 
of the two religions to create a Eurasian identity.100 
Ilan Berman identifies a change of course by President Putin, in the 
direction of Eurasianism. He argues that: ‘Indeed, by all indications, the 
growing emphasis on geopolitics from all corners of the Russian political 
spectrum is rapidly elevating Eurasianism to the level of a mainstream 
ideology.’ 101 Berman catalogues the growing influence of the doctrine and its 
controversial guru, Aleksandr Dugin,102 on Russian officials and policy-
makers, and points out that on 13 November 2000, Putin himself affirmed that 
‘Russia has always seen itself as a Euro-Asian nation’.103 Putin’s creation of 
the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (see above) as a regional ‘rapid 
reaction force’ in May 2001, and of the Eurasian Economic Community on 
1 June 2001 can be seen as a concretisation of Eurasianist concepts. 
On 21 June 2002, Dugin’s Eurasian Party was registered.104 The co-
founders were significant: the Supreme Mufti of Russia, and the Chairman of 
the Central Muslim Religious Board, Talgat Tadjuddin. The ideology of the 
new party was encapsulated by Aleksandr Panarin’s ‘History’s Revenge’ 
which, in Gordon Hahn’s words, ‘incorporates strains of Russia’s political 
culture: anti-Westernism, messianism, Prometheanism, and anti-
rationalism’.105 Thus, in the view of its founders: 
It is uniquely poised to organise an alternative to the techno-economic 
globalisation threatening global ecology. Since Russia’s Orthodox 
civilisation is the only one with affinity to the Buddhist, Confucian and 
Islamic civilisations, only it can gather them together to counter the 
expansion of environmental and cultural pollution and poverty to 
countries left behind in globalisation. 
To the surprise of most Western commentators, President Putin took the 
new orientation to its logical conclusion when he visited Malaysia on 5–
6 August 2003. In an interview with the Malaysian New Straits Times on 
3 July, before he left, he noted that Malaysia would soon chair the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference. He added: 
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Christians are in the majority in Russia, but we have about 20 million 
Muslims and these are not emigrants who have come from other states. 
They are Russians, people who view Russia as their homeland. And in 
this sense, without stretching the point or exaggerating, one can say that 
Russia is a part of the Islamic world.106 
While in Malaysia he noted that Russia has more Muslims then Malaysia, and 
expressed keen interest in Russia’s membership of the OIC, either as a member 
or an observer. At a meeting on 14 August with Russia’s ambassador to the 57-
member OIC, Putin said that: ‘Russian Muslims have every right to feel they 
are part of the Islamic world.’107 Putin was one of four special invitees to the 
10th OIC summit on 16–18 October 2003, at which the Russian Federation was 
to be an observer.108 
Conclusion 
Thus post-imperial, post-Soviet Russia and its enigmatic president are showing 
signs of an ideological turn which could provide the basis for a complex set of 
new juridical and constitutional relations with its southern borderlands.109 
Giorgadze emphasises the importance of Putin’s Foreign Policy Concept, 
which states: 
There is a growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar 
structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the 
United States. In solving principal questions of international security, 
the stakes are being placed on western institutions and forums of limited 
composition, and on weakening the role of the UN Security Council. 
The strategy of unilateral actions can destabilize the international 
situation, provoke tensions and the arms race, aggravate interstate 
contradictions, national and religious strife. The use of power methods 
bypassing existing international legal mechanisms cannot remove the 
deep socio-economic, inter-ethnic and other contradictions that underlie 
conflicts, and can only undermine the foundations of law and order. 
This leads to a rather opaque formulation, but one which can readily be 
decoded on the basis of the preceding section of this paper: ‘A distinguishing 
feature of Russia’s foreign policy is that it is a balanced one. This has been 
predetermined by the geopolitical position of Russia as one of the largest 
Eurasian powers, requiring an optimal combination of efforts along all 
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vectors.’110 As Arial Cohen points out, this concept, together with the Defence 
Doctrine, National Security Concept, and Information Security Concept, all 
issued in 2000, ‘decry the emergence of a unipolar world dominated by the 
United States. They lay claim to a sphere of influence that encompasses most 
of the eastern hemisphere.’111 
This paper has sought to bring to light and analyse some of the 
complexities of the relations between the Russian Federation and its southern 
borderlands, former acquisitions of the Russian Empire, and former members 
of the Soviet Union. Russia may have lost legal sovereignty, but its political 
and ideological influence remain strong. The ideas of Eurasianism appear to be 
responsible for a new dynamic, a Russian turn to the Islamic world and 
especially to its neighbours in the face of US hegemony, which could yet have 
surprising results. 
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